Backman v. Lawrence Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 35151 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-20-2008
Backman v. Lawrence Respondent's Brief Dckt.
35151
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Backman v. Lawrence Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35151" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1840.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1840
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BOB BACKMAN and RHONDA \ 
I BACKMAN, husband and wife, 1 
Appellants, ) 1 v. 1 
JAMES A. SPAGON and LINDA I. 1 
SPAGON, husband and wife; KENNETH 1 
G. LLOYD and PRISCILLA I. LLOYD, 1 -. 
husband and wife; BRUCE JOHNSON 1 SUPREME COURT NO. 35151 
and DEBORAH JOHNSON, husband and f 
wife; THOMAS L. LAWRENCE and 
DEBRA A. LAWRENCE, husband and 1 
wife; KEVIN D. SCHRADER, a single 1 
person; WESTON SCOTT MILLWARD, a 1 
married man; and PEND OREILLE VIEW 1 
ESTATES OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, 1 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 1 
GREGORY ZIRWES and THERESA 1 
ZIRWES, husband and wife; 1 
CHRISTOPHER BESSLER, an individual; 
PATRICK McKENNA and MICHELLE 
1 
McKENNA, husband and wife, and 
1 
CHRISTOPHER E. GRANT and SUSAN R. 1 
GRANT, husband and wife, 1 1 
Respondents. 1 ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
SPAGON, ET A L  
Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Court Judge, Presiding 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District for  Bonner County 
Case No: CV-2008-365 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BOB BACKMAN and RHONDA 
BACKMAN, husband and wife, 
Appellants, 
V. 
JAMES A. SPAGON and LINDA I. 
SPAGON, husband and wife; KENNETH 
G, LLOYD and PRISCILLA I. LLOYD, 
husband and wife; BRUCE JOHNSON 
and DEBORAH JOHNSON, husband and 
wife; THOMAS L. LAWRENCE and 
DEBRA A. LAWRENCE, husband and 
wife; KEVIN D. SCHRADER, a single 
person; WESTON SCOTT MILLWARD, a 
married man; and PEND OREILLE VIEW 
ESTATES OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
GREGORY ZIRWES and THERESA 
ZIRWES, husband and wife; 
CHRISTOPHER BESSLER, an individual; 
PATRICK McKENNA and MICHELLE 
McKENNA, husband and wife, and 
CHRISTOPHER E. GRANT and SUSAN R. 
GRANT, husband and wife, 
Respondents. 
) 
1 SUPREME COURT NO. 35151 
1 
1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
SPAGON, ET AL 
Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Court Judge, Presiding 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District for Bonner County 
Case No. CV-2008-365 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
B. Course of Proceedings 
C. Statement of Facts 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Unity of Title cannot be Traced to United States 
1. U.S. Supreme Court Denies Easement by Necessity 
2. Wisconsin: Grantor Gave Away Access to his Property 
3. No Implied Easements in Loqgina Country 
B. Backmans did not Prove Easement by Necessity 
1. 
2. No Necessity at Time of Convevance 
C. Backmans Cannot Claim Private Condemnation 
1. Private Residences are not Material Resources 
D. Backmans Failed to Prove any of the Five Elements 
Of Their Prescriptive Easement Claim 
1. Common Use Rule Properlv Ap~l ied 
2. Powers Property was Wild and Unenclosed 
E. Respondents Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF CASES 
B & J Development & Investments, Inc. v. Parsons, I26 ldaho 
504,8887 P.2d 49 (App. 1994). 25 
Billy Hill Cooper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Broom, 4 Cal. App. 
180, 87 P. 233 ( I  906). 17 
Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 ldaho 556, 155 P.680, 
1919 Ann. Cas. 189 (1916). 32 
Blackwell v. Mayes County Utility Services Authority, 571 P.2d 
435 (Okla. 1977). 28,29 
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535,681 P.2d 1010 
(App. 1984). 25,29 
Burley Brick and Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 ldaho 333,629 
P.2d 1168 (1981). 25,26 
Cohen v. Larson, 125 Idaho 82,867 P.2d 956 (1993). 30, 31, 33 
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (App. 1983). 25,'31,40, 41 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trusf, 141 ldaho 123, 106 
P.3d 449 (2005). 31,32 
Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 215 P.2d 812 (1950). 3 1 
Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074 (1979). 3 1 
Gibson v. Ada County,l42 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006). 4 1 
Graham v. Mack, 699 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1984). 28 
Guess v. Azar, 57 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1952). 16 
Hodgins v. Sales, 135 Idaho 222, 76 P.Ed 969 (2003). 34 
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (2006). 41 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474,129 P.3d 1223 (2006) 
Jackson v. Nash, 866 P.2d 262 (Nev. 1993) 
Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal. App. 4'h 796 (2002). 
Kinschefl v. United States, 565 F.2d 159 (gth Cir. 1978). 
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 99 S.Ct. 
103, 59 L.Ed.2d 677 (1979). 
MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 ldaho 11 15,739 P.3d 414 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
McKenney v. Anselmo, 91 ldaho 18,416 P.2d 509 (1966). 
Melendez v. Nintz, I I I ldaho 401, 724 P.2d 137. 
(App. 1986). 
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 ldaho 769, 88 P.426, 
118 Am. St. R. 233 (1906). 
Roberts v. Swim, 117 ldaho 9,784 P.2d 339 (App. 1989). 
Schwab v. Timmons, 324 Wis. 2d 27,589 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 
1999). 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136, 118 P.2d 740. 
State V. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 21 3 (Tex. 1927). 
State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995 (D.C. Utah 1979) 
Superior Oil Company v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 (gth 
Cir., 1965). 
United States v. Rindge (D.C.), 208 F. 619. 
Woods v. Houle; 766 P. 2d 250 (Mont. 1988). 
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
Article 1, Section 14, ldaho Constitution 
Idaho Code §§7-701 et seq. 30 
Colson, THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION,THE TIE THAT BINDS (1 991) 32 
Vol. 7, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, Second Edition (2006) 26.27,29,30 
25 AM JUR. 2d, Easements and Licenses, 333, p. 531. 15 
Vol. 25A, CORPUS JURlS SECONDUM, Easements, 31 12, 
Unity of Title, pp. 316 - 317. 16 
94 A.L.R. 3d 503, 517 - 518 (1979)."Unity of Title for Easement 
by Implication or Way of Necessity." 16 
1. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
The I00  acres purchased by Bob and Rhonda Backman in 2005 was a 
part of thousands of acres of timberland owned by Humbird Lumber Company in 
Bonner County between 1900 and 1948.' From its commencement, Humbird 
Lumber Company put its lands on the market for sale as soon as they were cut 
over. Tr., p. 680, L. 6 - 9. 
The Backman 100 acres is steep, rocky and never had been used for any 
purpose other than logging. This case was initiated and has been carried on 
because the title insurance examiner in the Sandpoint office of Alliance Title 
misread two recorded easements as providing access to the 100 acres when 
they did not. Tr., p. 73, L. 20 -25; p. 74, L. 1 -7. Chicago Title Company issued 
a title insurance policy dated January 22, 2005 to the Backmans in the amount of 
$475,000 guaranteeing access by record to the 100 acres when there was no 
deeded access. Tr., p. 97, L. 20 - 23. Defendants Exhibit Q. Chicago Title 
Company had earlier issued a title insurance policy dated December 9, 2004 to 
the Powers in the amount of $420,000 similarly guaranteeing access. 
Defendants Exhibit D. 
After finding that there was no access of record, title insurance counsel 
acting on behalf of the Backmans filed suit on February 24, 2006 seeking access 
upon other theories, all of which were rejected as lacking basis in fact and in law 
' There are eight reported ldaho Supreme Court cases in which Humbird Lumber Company is a 
party. Vol. 10, ldaho Digest, Table of Cases, p. 293. 
by Judge Charles W. Hosack in two opinions. R., Vol. II, pp. 258 -299 and 370 - 
375. 
As of the date of acquisition of the 100 acres in Section 8 by the 
Backmans, there were no recognizable roads in use to Section 8 from any of the 
properties in Section 7 owned by any of the named respondents. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The course of proceedings set forth in the Appellants' Brief is 
chronologically accurate. Respondents Spagon, et al will supplement as follows. 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Robert and Lynn Walsh as defendants on 
December 11,2006. The Backmans filed a Second Amended Complaint on 
January 11,2007 adding Christopher and Susan Grant who had purchased the 
Walsh property. R., Vol. I, pp. 113 - 122. Attorney Peter C. Erbland has 
represented the Grants. 
Respondents Spagon, et al joined by the Grants answered the Second 
Amended Complaint asserting that none of the Backman theories were 
supported by facts or law. R., Vol. I, pp. 91 - 97. An amended counterclaim 
was filed on January 26,2007 seeking to enjoin the Backmans from any entry 
upon any of the roads in Section 7 maintained and controlled by Pend Oreille 
View Estates Association, Inc. (POVE) R., Vol. I, pp. 130 -142. 
Appellants Spagon, et al and Grants rejected each of the Backman 
theories. 
1. The Backmans could not prove any road use by them or their 
predecessors which was open and notorious or continuous and 
uninterrupted or adverse under a claim of right or with actual or 
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imputed knowledge of the owners or for the five year period. None 
of the five required elements of prescriptive use could be proven. 
2. In Cohen v. Larson, 123 ldaho 82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993), a 
unanimous ldaho Supreme Court held that development of private 
residences was not a public use so private condemnation was not 
allowable under the ldaho Constitution and statutes. The use 
sought by the Backmans was for private residences. 
3. The three necessary elements of easement by necessity, unity of 
ownership, necessity at the time of severance and present great 
necessity did not exist and could not be proven. 
4. There could not be any coupling of easements. The law does not 
allow for such. There, in fact, were no easements in Section 7 to 
Section 8 to couple on any theory. 
R., Vol. [I, Ex. Post Trial Brief of Spagon, et al, October 2, 2007, pp. 6 - 18. 
Appellants' Brief accurately summarizes Judge Hosack's post-trial actions. 
B. Statement of Facts 
In 1890, when Idaho became a state, the human settlement in the 
Panhandle was concentrated in the mining district in Shoshone County which 
had been one of the first four counties created in the Washington Territory in 
1861.' Kootenai County, which included what are now Bonner, Boundary and 
Benewah Counties, was created in 1881. The Northern Pacific Railroad reached 
to Pend Oreilie Lake in 1882 with a branch to Coeur d'Alene described as "a city 
of 200 or 300 in 1886.3 
Arrington, Vol. I, HISTORY OF IDAHO, (1994), p. 426. 
3@A pp. 325 a n d  333. 
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Leonard Arrington credits the continued expansion of the Northern Pacific 
through Bonners Ferry and Sandpoint to Spokane in 1893 with the gradual 
development of that area: 
The railroad was responsible for much of the immigration into the 
area north of Sandpoint in the 1890's and early years of the twentieth 
century. 4 
In 2006, Nancy Renk, one of the witnesses for respondents, had written a 
report for the U.S. Army Corps of ~ngineers.' Humbird Lumber Company was 
the early owner of the property acquired by the Backmans and the prior use of 
that land is relevant. 
In 1900, John P. Humbird, one of the partners of Frederick Weyerhaeuser, 
created the Humbird Lumber Company and purchased the only substantial 
sawmill in sandpoint.' The company immediately set off to purchase in several 
separate transactions 159,051 acres mostly in what became Bonner County from 
the Northern Pacific Ra i l r~ad .~  
The company obtained other land in smaller parcels from individual 
owners.' One of these transactions was the purchase on August 20, 1908 by 
Humbird Lumber Company of the Backman 100 acres from Eimore McKenna 
who had obtained a patent from the United States on October 23, 1907.' 
Renk wrote that in the 1900 to 1930 period of time, Humbird like other 
timber companies "was not designed to be a never-ending operative using 
4 id,- p. 334. 
When the Lake Was A Millpond: Humbird Lumber Company and Its Sawmill at Sandpoint, 
Idaho 1900 - 1948 (Hereafter Renk Report.) 
6 Renk Report, pp. 5 - 6. Photocopies of pages cited are attached as Appendix A. 
'Id. pp. 9 - 10. 
8- Id. p. 11. 
'Gfendants Exhibits B and C. 
sustainable yield practice in its forests" but instead sold the lands as soon as the 
timber was cut.'' 
In the 1900's through the 1920's, roads in Bonner County were "fairly 
minimal" and public roads even fewer and needing to be created by petition to 
the county commissioners." The timber companies entered into cooperative 
agreements for mutual uses of logging roads on their respective properties.'2 
Judge Hosack recognized this mutual permission in his Memorandum 
Opinion: 
Given the number of land holdings in different ownerships 
throughout vast tracts of timberland, mutual consent and neighborly 
cooperation worked well. Logging operations pretty much was all  
there was, and objections to log trucks by owners of high-end 
residences located deep in the woods was not only unheard of, but 
entirely inconceivable. As Larry Moody testified, "nobody ever 
dreamed there would be homes up there ever." 
R., Vol. II, pp. 277 - 278. 
The Backman property ownership can be traced back of record to a grant 
from the United States to McKenna in 1907. Defendants Exhibit G. In 1908, 
Humbird Lumber Company acquired the Backman property in Section 8 and the 
property owned at the time of filing the complaint in Section 7 by Millward, Walsh, 
Lloyd, Johnson and Lawrence. 
Humbird Lumber Company on December 22,1943 executed a deed 
recorded January 8, 1945 to Lewis Modig to the SE I14 NE114 and El l2  SE114 in 
Section 7,  Twp 57 North, R.2 WBM. Defendants Exhibit H. That is the property 
10 
11 
Renk Report, p. 46. 
12 
Tr., p. 686, L. 14 - 19. 
Tr., p. 688, L. 1 - 25; p. 685, L. 1 - 23. Defendants Exhibit RR. 
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owned at the time of filing of the complaint by Millward, Walsh, Lloyd, Johnson 
and Lawrence. 
On February 2, 1945, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed all of its 
property in Bonner County to Eva A. wert.I3 Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. The deed 
included the 120 acres Humbird Lumber owned in Section 8 which later became 
the Backman 100 acres and the 20 acres purchased by respondent Kevin D. 
Schrader. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. Also included in the conveyance was what was 
described as "All of fractional Section 7,  Twp 57 North, Range 2 WBM." This 
description included the NE 114 NE 114 owned at the time this complaint was filed 
by Rogers, Schrader, Spagon and two others not parties to this lawsuit. 
Combining the deed to Modig (SE 114 NE 114 and E 112 SE 114) with the 
deed to Wert (NE 114 NE 114) makes the total parcels conveyed away by 
Humbird Lumber Company in 1943 and 1945 to constitute the El l2  NE114 and 
El l2  SE114 in Section 7. This is the property starting with ownership by the 
Spagons to the north continuing south to ownership by the Lawrences. 
In 1943 and 1945, there were no roads in existence on the Backman 
property or the Spagon to Lawrence properties. See 1939 Metsker Map, 
Defendants Exhibit D attached as Appendix B. 
As can be seen from the 1939 Metsker Map and from the deed to Eva A. 
Wert, Humbird Lumber Company owned real property all over Bonner County on 
13 Eva Wert was the sister of Jim Brown who owned Long Lake Lumber Company. Tr., p. 685, L. 
11 - 14. Long Lake Lumber Company later became Pack River Lumber Company. Tr.. p. 685, 
L. 20 - 22. 
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some of which were public roads. The E 112 NE114 and the El12 SE114, Section 
7 did not touch upon a public road or upon any road at all. 
From 1907 through 1945 and for many years thereafter the hills and 
mountains in Bonner County had few houses. The state and federal lands and 
most of the private lands, not in farms, were timber country. Skid roads were 
adequate to remove the cut trees and haul them to the mills. 
Randy Powers, who is a logger, acquired the 100 acres in Section 8 by 
deed from Shamrock Investment on December 8, 1993. Defendants Exhibit G. 
The only roads proven of record to have ever been used as access from 
Section 7 into the Backman property in Section 8 were those punched through by 
Randy Powers during his logging operation on that land beginning in December 
of 1993 and lasting two years. Tr., p. 260, L. 4 - 13. Powers admitted that all 
the property before he purchased in 1993 was wild and unenclosed. Tr., p. 256, 
L. 19 - 21. Powers purchased his property as timber property. Tr., p. 257, L. 1 - 
14. 
The first road Powers made identified in trial as the lower road came off 
Turtle Rock Road across what is now the Lloyd property to Syringa Creek which 
had washed out whatever had passed for a road in a logging operation six years 
earlier. Tr., p. 257, L. 6 - I I ;  p. 268, . 2 - 12. Powers could not get to his 
property initially. Tr., p. 268, L. 14 - 16. Powers admitted that in 1993 the lower 
road was "not a road in use." Tr., p. 268, L. 24 - 25. 
Powers bulldozed a road across the creek into Section 8 and logged his 
property from the lower road for a year into the winter of 1994. Tr., p. 269, L. 17 - 
24. Powers began logging off the middle road into Section 8 in July 1994, then 
moved to the top. Tr., p. 226, L. 8 -  12; p. 294, L. 13- 18. 
Powers finished his logging in 1996 using the upper road and taking his 
logs out over Inspiration Way and Redtail Hawk Road. Tr., p. 279, L, 5 - 13. 
Powers' logging operation was completed in 1996. He did not log again. After 
Powers completed logging in 1996, he ". . . never was back with machinery." Tr., 
p. 281, L. 18-21. 
The lower road was shut down by the Idaho Department of Lands in 1994 
soon after it was opened. The middle road grew back and was not used by 
Powers or anybody else after 1995. 
Yellowstone Basin Properties purchased the property owned by most of 
the respondents from Louisiana Pacific Corporation in 1994, had it surveyed, 
created Pend Oreille View Estates Owners Association, Inc. (POVE) and in July 
of 1996 recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
making all roads private. Defendants Exhibits A, B and C. 
The roads within the POVE controlled property were constructed by 
Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc. and Bluegreen Corporation of Montana after 
the property was platted in 1994 into 20 + acre lots in a purchase from Louisiana 
Pacific Corporation. Record of Survey, Gordon E. Sorenson. Defendants 
Exhibit A. 
The roads created by the developer were named Turtle Rock, Redtail 
Hawk and, leaving the POVE property, lnspiration Way. Turtle Rock Road starts 
at an intersection with Baldy Mountain Road going in an easterly direction 
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through properties owned by McKenna, Bessler and Lawrence and then turns 
north through Lloyd and Johnson to terminate on the Millward and Walsh (Grant) 
properties. 
Redtail Hawk Road extends north from the intersection with Turtle Rock 
Road through the Harris property and then becoming lnspiration Way through the 
Spagon property. 
The Spagons bought their property in April of 1999 and built a house. Tr., 
p. 265, L. 9 - 15. By that time, Turtle Rock Road as extended north into 
Inspiration Way had been abandoned, overgrown and was not passable by an 
automobile. Tr., p. 293, L. 24 - 256; p. 294, L. 1 - 25; p. 296, L. 1- 7. 
The developers improved Redtail Hawk and Turtle Rock Road while 
dividing the POVE property into 20 acre parcels. The C. C. and R's were 
explicitly specific: 
Ziwes A: ". . .Said rights of way are private roads, maintained for the 
use and benefit of the Tract Owners, their guests, and those 
others entitled by legal instrument to the use of the same." 
Reed Q: And that private road situation, has that been regularly 
followed? 
Ziwes A: Yes. 
Tr., p. 453, L. 17 - 23. Defendants Exhibit B. 
The PowersIBackman 100 acres at its base is approximately 2,600 feet in 
elevation and at the top is approximately 3,600 feet. Plaintiffs Exhibit 43, p. 5. 
Baldy Mountain Road at the Sandpoint Shooting Range is about 2,600 feet. The 
horizontal difference between the north line of the Backman property and the 
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south line measures on the 1966 map as approximately 4,000 feet. This equates 
to a grade between 22" and 23". The close contour lines confirm the steepness. 
On February 8, 1994 Powers had quitclaimed his 100 acres to his mother, 
Kay McGhee, to protect against creditors. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. Mrs. McGhee 
quitclaimed the 100 acres back to Randy Powers on May 10, 1995. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 13. 
On the advice of Doug Ward, a broker operating Sundance Realty, a 
warranty deed was prepared which Mrs. McGhee signed on December 3,2004. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 14. Parcel I on the deed describes the 100 acres. Parcel 2 
identifies certain recorded easements in Section 7. 
Again on the advice of Doug Ward, Rapdy Powers presented the warranty 
deed to Alliance Title and Escrow Company and asked for a title insurance policy 
in the amount of $420,000 for property he had in fact owned since at least May 5, 
1995. Tr.,p.404,L. 17-25;in405,L. 1-18. 
The title examiner was perhaps misled by the easements described as 
Parcel 2 on the December 3,2004 deed from Powers' mother, Kay McGhee. 
The policy for $420,000 was issued on December 9,2004. Defendants 
Exhibit 0. 
On December 27,2004, Bob and Rhonda Backman signed a contract to 
buy the Powers' property upon the representation by real estate salesman Doug 
Ward that the title insurance would guarantee access and that in a hot real estate 
market Bob Backman could turn the property over quickly at a much higher price. 
Defendants Exhibit P. Tr., p. 67, L. 14 - 25. 
On February 11,2005, Alliance Title and Escrow Company issued its title 
policy in the amount of $475,000 which, by silence, guaranteed access and 
within a month Bob Backman had two offers from buyers willing to pay in excess 
of one million dollars. Tr., p. 80, L. 17 - 24. 
In the summer of 2004 after he had decided to sell his property, Powers in 
a one day operation clandestinely hauled in a bulldozer and cleared out the 
middle road. When respondent Bruce Johnson discovered the trespass across 
his property, he reported it to the sheriff and soon thereafter blocked off the 
newly cut clearing. Tr., p. 622, L. 12 - 25; p. 623, L. I - 9; p. 625, L. 1 - 12. On 
August 19, 2004 on behalf of POVE, a letter was sent to Powers charging him 
with trespass. Defendants Exhibit U. 
On April 18,2005 at the request of POVE, undersigned counsel Reed 
wrote a letter to Doug Ward, the Backmans and the Powers advising that there 
was no right to use the POVE roads. Defendants Exhibits V and W. Thereafter, 
Backman quit paying Powers. Tr., p. 70, L. 12 - 17. 
Respondent Greg Zirwes testified that he was road supervisor for POVE, 
a part-time job involving a couple of hundred hours a year contracting and doing 
work on the two roads. Tr., p. 454, L. 3 - 4, p. 456, L. 9 - 12. That task included 
stopping strangers and advising them that they were on a private road. Tr., p. 
465, L. 18 - 25, 
Greg Zirwes gave several reasons why POVE opposed the Backman 
development: invasion of community property, 16% grades which were twice 
county fire standards; necessary widening that would cost $450,000. Tr, p. 463, 
L. 9 - 19; p. 464, L. 8 - 23; p. 465, L. 2-9. 
Theresa Zirwes, Secretary-Treasurer of POVE, confirmed the continuing 
surveillance, and documented their enforcement to keep non-members including 
Randy Powers off the roads. Tr., p. 562, L. 21 - 25; p. 563, L. 1 - 25; p. 564, L. 
In her testimony, Theresa Zirwes went through a series of photographs 
depicting the two roads starting with the "private road" sign at the entrance to 
POVE controlled land. Tr., p. 565, L. 13 - 18. Defendants Exhibit EE. 
Theresa described her opposition to the Backman intrusion: preservation 
of the community; the very difficult, steep, narrow and difficult to handle roads. 
Tr., p. 581, L. 1 - 25; p. 582, L. 1- 7. 
Dr. Michael Folsom, expert witness for appellants, used blow up aerial 
photos to speculate that there had been roads which he called "tracks" from 
Section 7 into Section 8. Plaintiffs Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 44. 
Richard Creed, P.E., who had worked for the Forest Service in the 
Sandpoint area for 26 years and testified as an expert witness for respondents, 
distinguished between "tracks" and "roads." 
Erbland Q: Okay. The term "track" as it applies to road management, are 
you familiar with that? 
Creed A: It is not a term that normally used in my experience in roads. 
Tracks imply a couple of wheel marks or animal tracks, 
whatever you would. A road is constructed as a road prism, it 
has cut slope, back slope, fill slope. It has drainage. 
Tr., p. 500, L. 9 -14. 
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Based on his long-time experience with timber companies, Richard Creed 
corroborated the testimony of historian Nancy Renk that when the timber 
properties were privately owned, the timber companies would allow access to 
each others properties without actual recorded easements. Tr., p. 503, L. 21 - 
25; p. 504, L. 1- I I. It was Mr. Creed's opinion after travelling over all the roads 
in issue that these roads would not meet applicable Bonner County road and fire 
standards for the type of residential development that the Backmans and their 
real estate agent, Doug Ward, had sought and advertised. Tr., p. 507, L. 21 - 
25; p. 508, L. 1- 16. Defendants Exhibits T and GG. 
Mr. Creed identified certain portions of the Turtle Rock Road, Redtail 
Hawk Road and Inspiration Way Road as being too steep or too narrow or both 
in violation of Bonner County fire codes and road standards for residential 
construction. Tr., p. 507, L. 5 - 25; p. 508, L. I- 16. 
Respondents' expert witness, Graydon Johnson, had been given copies of 
Dr. Folsom aerial photos and exhibits and then obtained duplicate originals from 
the United States Geological Service Office in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Tr., p. 
636, L. 13 - 25; p. 637, L. 1- 9. Mr. Johnson's opinion, from viewing all the 
photographs which he had obtained being most of those used by Dr. Folsom, 
was that there was no support for the distinction Dr. Folsom had made between 
"tracks" and "roads." Tr., p. 662, L. 22 - 25; p. 603, L. 1- 3: 
. . .the information you can gather off of these photographs is too 
ambiguous to really reach any concrete decisions on conclusions. 
Tr., p. 663, L. 2 - 4. 
Judge Hosack made an interesting observation in overruling the objection 
of attorney Featherston to Mr. Johnson's opinions: 
The Court: . . . but it (Google aerial photo) shows this road or this 
track or that everybody agrees is completely overgrown and washed 
out and totally obliterated, and it is just as obvious on a Google site 
as the road into the gun range. And having used Google before, I 
don't trust it anv further than vou can throw it. So I don't think he is 
telling us anything that is not;eadily obvious by looking at the 
documents he has put in. And that's all he has really done. So I 
think it just does to.the weight. And for that reason iwould overrule 
the objection. 
Tr., p. 668, L. 7 - 14. 
Lannie Moody, testifying for respondents, had been a logger for 35 years. 
Tr., p. 536, L. 2 - 3. Louis Modig, the grantee from Humbird Lumber Company in 
1943, was Lannie Moody's grandfather.14 
Lannie Moody and his family had logged the Backman property in 1975 
Tr., p. 546, L. 2 - 22. What was created and used was: 
Just a one-lane logging access only, steep, narrow, rocky, rough. 
Tr., p. 542, L. 15 - 16. 
Based on personal experience and clear recollection, Lannie Moody 
dismissed the idea that any usable roads had ever been constructed, much less 
used going from Section 7 into Section 8: 
Reed Q: And the road as it was originally located back in the 1970's 
was straight up through here? 
Moody A: Straight up through here. It was not - just a logging access. 
Back in those days, roads were all built for the course of least 
resistance, get in as cheap as you can and you know. 
'4 The rest of the family changed names to "Moody," but Louis stuck with the Swedish "Modig." 
Tr., p. 536, L. 20 - 24. 
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Reed Q: So all the area that you are talking about and all the roads that 
were there were logging roads and nothing more than that? 
Moody A: Nothing more. Nobody ever dreamed there would be homes 
up there ever, you know. 
Tr., p. 543, L. 5 - 14. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Are the Memorandum Order, the oral ruling from the bench and 
subsequent Order denying motion to amend and the Judgment entered by 
District Judge Charles W. Hosack supported by substantial and competent 
evidence and by statutory and appellate case authority? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Unity of Title cannot be Traced to United States. 
The Brief of Appellants Backman leads in with an invitation to overrule 
Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9,784 P.2d 339 (App. 1989). The prominence given 
to this argument (pp. 10 - 17) reflects the weakness and lack of legal and factual 
support for the remaining arguments. 
Refusal to recognize common ownership in the original grantor, the 
sovereign United States or the state, is solidly supported in the cases around the 
country and in the texts: 
The fact that all of  the land was originally part of the public domain 
and hence owned by a common grantor cannot confer the right from 
which a way of necessity arises. Similarly, the doctrine of implied 
reservation of a right-of-way by necessity is not applicable where the 
unity of tltle on which it rests can be found only in the state. 
25 AM. JUR.2d., Easements and Licenses, $33, p. 531. 
To the same effect see Vol. 25A, CORPUS JURlS SECONDUM, 
Easements, § I  12, Unity of Title, pp. 316 -317. 
The annotation in "Unity of Title for Easement by Implication or Way of 
Necessity," 94 A.L.R. 3d 503, 517 -518 (1979) cited in Roberts v. Swim, supra, 
summarized the case law: 
. . . the original ownership of lands by the public or state does 
not provide the necessary unity of ownership to support a 
subsequently arising way of necessity. 
The A.L.R. supplement to this date includes Roberts v. Swim, but no 
recent cases to the contrary. 
In Idaho, all private property came originally from the United States. 
Going back to the original federal grants to find easements by necessity without 
any contemporary evidence would mean that every present day owner was 
entitled to an easement across his or her neighbors' property to the nearest 
present public road. There would be no need for a court ever to consider 
prescriptive use easements. 
The cases cited in the annotation are in line with the lead note. One in 
particular, Guess v. Azar, 57 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1952), nailed the fundamental 
problem with going back to the original sovereign grantors quoting JONES ON 
EASEMENTS, page 247: 
"It would be ruinous to establish the precedent contended for, since 
by it every grantee from the earliest history of the State, and those 
who succeed to his title, would have an implied right of way over all 
surrounding and adjacent lands held under junior grants, even to the 
utmost limits of the State." 
There are other cases not mentioned in A.L.R. In Stafe v. Black Bros., 
297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927), the Texas Supreme Court cited two of the cases in 
the annotation and then quoted from United States v. Rindge (D.C.), 208 F. 619: 
"it is, in my judgment, very doubtful whether the doctrine of implied 
ways of necessity has any application to grants from the general 
government, under the public land laws. Pearne v. Coal Coke [Min. 81 
Mfg.] Co., 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S.W. 402; Bully Hill C.M. 8 S. Co. v. 
Bruson, 4 Cal. App. 180,87 P. 237. It it exists at all, it can be invoked 
against the government and its grantees as well as in their favor. 
Hence every grantee of a portion of the public domain from the time 
the land laws were extended over the same and those succeeding to 
his title would have an implied right of way over the surrounding and 
adjacent public lands, and a junior grant thereof i f  necessary to 
reach his own land, and a junior grantee and his successors in 
interest would have such a way over a prior grant under similar 
circumstances simply because they derive title from a common 
source." 
297 S.W. at 218. 
Easement cases are sitespecific. It appears from a cursory reading of 
Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal. App. 4th 796 (2002), cited by appellants, that the 
dominant property in question had been a patented mining claim and the title 
record made it evident that the original conveyance by the federal government of 
the mine left no access way for the mining products to be brought out. 
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals guessing an intent 175 years ago 
and its attempted distinction of the founding anti-sovereign law in California relied 
on by the trial court, Billy Hill Cooper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Broom, 4 Cal. 
App. 180, 87 P. 233 (1906), is unconvincing. Suffice to say that there is no 
record in this case of any use being made of any roads in 1943 - 1945 
comparable to the mining access found necessary in Kellogg v. Garcia 
The other cases cited in Appellants' Brief do not lend weight or are 
distinguishable. Kinscherffv. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (gth Cir. 1978) is a 
reversal of dismissal presumably on summary judgment on a claim based on 
necessity. The Court of Appeals found factual disputes and cautiously 
expressed ". . .no opinion as to whether such an easement here exists, nor its 
extent." 586 P.2d at 161. 
One of the cases cited in the Kinscherffopinion illustrates the limitations 
on easement by necessity even where the claim is recognized against the 
sovereign. In Superior Oil Company v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 (gth Cir 
1965), the issue was whether the oil company could use a road across lndian 
country. The interpretation was of a patent from the federal government to the 
Women's American Baptist Home Mission Society in 1910 with no subsequent 
transfer. 
The oil company wanted to move heavy equipment across the mission 
land to a drill site. The Court recognized that an easement of necessity had been 
granted but the use was not available for heavy construction equipment: 
Certainly it cannot be said either that public policy demands or that 
the Indians' trustee impliedly intended a grant of a way of access 
across Indian lands greater in scope than was required for mission 
purposes and whose greater scope was necessary only in order to 
permit the granted lands to be used in a fashion adverse to the 
interests of the lndians. 
353 F.2d at 36. 
State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995 (D.C. Utah, 1979) is the 
exception that proves the rule. Again the interpretation was of original 
government deed to property still held by the original grantee. The grant was 
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state trust land from the United States to the State of Utah made at statehood in 
1894 with no subsequent change in ownership. The State leased the granted 
school land to a mining company. 
The mining company was denied access by the federal government 
across adjoining federal laws. The Court recognized that the doctrine of 
easement by necessity ". . . might not ordinarily apply in the context of a federal 
land grant. . . ." 486 F.Supp. at 1005 (page 10). However an exception was 
found for state school land grants: 
Unless a right of access is inferred, the very purpose of the school 
trust lands would fail. Without access the state could not develop 
the trust lands in any fashion and they would become economically 
worthless. This Congress did not intend. 
486 F.Supp. at 1005 (p. 10). 
All of the lands in Section 7 and Section 8 in this case came from railroad 
grants, not school land grants. 
1. U.S. Supreme Court Denies Easement bv Necessity 
In Utah v. Andrus, the Chief Judge Anderson noted the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,99 S.Ct. 103,59 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1979) and found it to be "not apposite." 486 F.Supp. 1005 (p. 10). 
That may or may not be an appropriate distinction. 
However, Leo Sheep Co. is squarely supportive of Judge Hosack's 
determination that original federal ownership will not support common ownership 
to provide easement by necessity. 
Easement by necessity was rejected even though it was sought by the 
original grantor, federal government. Just as in this case, private ownership 
began with a grant to the railroad, the Union Pacific. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
opened his opinion with a learned discussion of the background to and the 
culminating actions that lead to the Civil War railroad grant acts, in that instance 
the Union Pacific Act of 1862. The following analysis which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist subsequently describes as affecting "property rights in 150 million 
acres of land in the Western United States. . ." begins: 
This case is the modern legacy of these early grants. Petitioners, the 
Leo Sheep Co., and the Palm Livestock Co., are the Union Pacific 
Railroad's successors in fee to specific odd-numbered sections of 
land in Carbon County, Wyoming. 
59 L.3d 2d at 685. 
In the present case, respondents Spagon et al and Grant, are successors 
in interest to Louisiana Pacific corporation which acquired the property from the 
Northern Pacific Railroad. 
In Leo Sheep Co., the United States controlled the Seminoe Reservoir 
which was used by the public for fishing and hunting. The railroad grants of 
alternate sections left checkerboard squares so that access to the reservoir 
crossed private properties used for livestock crossing. The federal government 
cleared a dirt road across the private land and posted signs inviting the public to 
use the road as a route to the reservoir. 59 L.Ed.2d at 685. 
As here, there was no express easement. An 1878 opinion of Justice 
Field was cited as noting: 
. . .that the intent of Congress in making the Union Pacific grants was 
clear: "It was to aid in the construction of the road by a gift of lands 
along its route, without reservation of rights, except such as were 
specifically mentioned. . . ." 
Chief Justice Rehnquist then reviewed the doctrine of easement by 
necessity as claimed by the government. He found two problems in the 
government's assertion. The second is the distinction noted in the Utah case 
that the sovereign state has the power of condemnation not applicable here. 
The first problem, an equal barrier to the government claim and directly in 
point, is this: 
First of all, whatever right of passage a private landowner might 
have, it is not at all clear that it would include the right to construct a 
road for public access to a recreational area. 
The opinion goes on to refuse to find an implied intent for a present day 
road use that could not possibly have been contemplated at the time of the 
original grant 100 years ago. 59 L.Ed 2d at 687. It was too far a reach for the 
fictional implied intent to find that Congress in 1862 meant to include the right to 
construct a road for public access to a recreational area a century later: 
In footnote 15, the opinion discounts subsequent changes in the dominant 
estate quoting from a New Jersey opinion: 
"Changes in the dominant parcel's use exert some, but not a great 
influence. in  determinina the scoae of such easements." 3 Powell, 
supra n. 14,1416, pp. 34- 203 to'34 -204 (footnotes omitted). See, 
e.g., Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co. 78 NJ Eq 434, 
79 A 326 (1911) (footpath, not roadway, proper scope of easement 
where use of dominant estate as clubhouse could not have been 
contemplated by parties to original grant). 
The exact same reasoning used by Chief Justice Rehnquist for a 
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court gives controlling guidance here to refuse to even 
consider easement by necessity on federal land granted to the railroad. 
Resource extraction, mining, lumber and farming, not residential development for 
high-end houses on steep ground, was the contemplated use for the 150 million 
acres of land in the Western United States granted to the railroads in the 1860's. 
Judge Hosack quoted the testimony of Larry Moody speaking of the 
Backman property as late as the 1990's: 
"Nobody ever dreamed there would be homes up there ever." 
R., Vol. II, p. 278. 
2. Wisconsin: Grantor Gave Away Access to his Property 
In Schwab v. Timmons, 324 Wis. 2d 27,589 N.W.2d I (Wis. 1999) the 
evidence established that the petitioners once had access to a public road on 
land which they had earlier sold off. Therefor the landlocking of their property did 
not result. ". . .from a grant of property to them but by their own acts in 
conveying away their highway access": 
An easement by necessity only exists where an owner sells a 
landlocked parcel to another, in which case the law will recognize a 
way of necessity in the grantee over the land retained by the grantor. 
Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Ass'n v. Township o f  Lake Mills, 195 
Wis.2d 348, 372,536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Ludke, 87 
Wis.2d at 229-30, 274 N.W.2d 641). The petitioners in this case are 
the grantors, not the grantees, and as in Rock Lake Estates, the 
conveyances which resulted in their landlocked property were made 
by the petitioners when they sold off the property above the bluff. 
We conclude that it would be contrary to this state's policy against 
encumbrances for this court to award an easement to the petitioners 
over parcels of unrelated third parties under these circumstances. 
Although there were no adjoining public roads in 1943 and 1945, the 
deeds have the same pattern here. Humbird Lumber Company sold off the tract 
of land to Modig across which the Backmans are now seeking an easement by 
necessity while retaining the 100 acres now owned by the Backmans. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 22. State policy in Idaho should be similar to Wisconsin in denying an 
award of an easement over parcels of the unrelated third parties, the eleven 
named respondents. 
The Backmans acted prudently in obtaining title insurance and thereby 
imposed upon Chicago Title and its agent, Alliance Title, the duty of search as 
described in an earlier Wisconsin decision: 
More recently in Kordecki v. Rizzo, 106 Wis.2d 713,719 n. 5, 317 
N.W.2d 479 (1982), this court reiterated that a purchaser of real estate 
has three sources of information from which to learn of rights to the 
land he or she is about to purchase: (1) reviewing the chain of title; 
(2) searching other public records that may reveal other non- 
recorded rights, such as judgments or liens; and (3) inspecting the 
land itself. These sources may be irrelevant under the petitioners' 
proposal i f  someone with a landlocked piece or property desired a 
right-of-way through another person's property "in the interest of 
development." 
The petitioners are effectively asking this court to sanction hidden 
easements. An easement which in this case was not created by, but 
was, according to petitioners, clearly intended by the United States 
at conveyance. 
589 N.W.2d at pp. 7 - 8. 
The Backmans have quite properly waived any claim to use of Redtail 
Hawk Road under any theory. Appellants Brief, p. 22. The Backmans' claim is 
solely and only of access from Turtle Rock Road in Section 7 into the Beckmans' 
property in Section 8. 
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As set forth above, there can be no claim of easement by necessity based 
upon original ownership by the United States. The claim must be supported by 
all of the elements of easements by necessity existing at the time Humbird 
Lumber Company conveyed away its property. 
3. No Implied Easements in Loaqing Country 
Before and at the time of the conveyance on December 22, 1943 to Modig 
and on February 2,1945 to Wert, no part of the Humbird Lumber Company 
property touched upon any public road nor upon any private road that connected 
to a public road. 
By deed dated December 22, 1943, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed 
to Lewis Modig the SE % NE % (40 acres) and the E 1/2 SE % (80 acres) in 
Section 7. Defendants Exhibit H. The 80 acres in Section 7 contiguous to the 
west is now in the ownership of respondents Millward, Lloyd, Johnson and Grant. 
By deed dated February 2,1945, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed to 
Eva A. Wert the S % NW % and S 1/2 NW % NW % (100 acres) in Section 8 
together with the rest of its property owned in Bonner County. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
4. The 100 acres in Section 8 is now owned by appellants Backman. 
From the time of the first patent from the United States to private 
ownership in 1907 until well into the 1990's all of the properties of plaintiffs and 
defendants were owned by lumber companies with the only use of the properties 
being logging. These logging companies did not need easements nor did they 
wish to grant easements. There was cooperation between the logging 
companies and also with the few non-company private owners. 
Permission was freely granted to allow logs to be hauled by horse, by 
tractor, by skidder and finally by truck from the logging sites to the public road 
and to the sawmills. All the properties were exactly as described by the Court of 
Appeals in denying the plaintiffs' claim for an implied easement in Cordwell v. 
Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (App. 1983): 
The area where appellants' tracts are located in steep, 
mountainous, forested country. The evidence shows that, 
until appellants purchased their scattered tracts there was no 
asserted need for year-round access to the area. None of the 
old logging roads beyond Ole Ladd's dwelling were kept open 
in the winter. With the exception of the Roush tract - not at 
issue in this appeal - none of the tracts has been occupied nor 
improved. 
105 ldaho at 82. 
Since there is absolutely no evidence of any road in apparent continuous 
use from Section 8 into Section 7 for a lengthy period prior to 1943, this type of 
implied easement needs no further discussion. 
B. Backmans did not Prove Easement bv Necessity 
The elements of easement by necessity were set forth in Bob Daniels & 
Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535,681 P.2d I010 (App. 1984) as follows: 
In contrast, an easement by necessity requires (1) unity of 
ownership prior to division of the tract; (2) necessity of an 
easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present 
necessity for the easement. 
106 ldaho at 542. 
Repeated in B & J Development & Invesfments, Inc. v. Parsons, 126 
Idaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, - (App. 1994). 
Implied easement by necessity may be established where ". . . a tract of 
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land is conveyed which is separated from the highway by other lands of the 
grantor. . ." Burley Brick and Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 333,335,629 
P.2d 1166, - (1981). The 120 acres in Section 8 did not touch upon a 
public road or any discernable private road at the time of conveyance in 1945. 
The 80 acres in Section 7 did not in 1943 touch upon a public or private 
road nor does it now touch upon Baldy Mountain Road which is the nearest 
public road. Turtle Rock Road, leaves the JohnsonlLloyd property, crosses 
Lawrence, Bessler and Chitlender (not a party to this lawsuit) properties and then 
onto City of Sandpoint property. These constitute four parcels of land never 
owned by Humbird Lumber Company. 
1. No Easement Allowed Over Third Pam 
The fiction of implied conveyance by necessity cannot be extended across 
property never conveyed. This obvious fact and law was set forth by the 
Montana Supreme Court in Woods v. Houle; 766 P.2D 250 (Mont. 1988). 
In Graham v. Mack, supra, this Court, speaking of easements by way 
of necessity, said: 
There are two basic elements (1) unity of ownership; and, (2) strict 
necessity. The necessity must exist at the time the unified tracts are 
severed. (Citing authority.) The way granted must be over the 
grantor's land and never over the land of a third party or stranger to 
the title (citing authority) and finally there must be strict unity of 
ownership." 699 P.2d at 596. 
In Vol. 7, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, Second Edition (2006) 
elaboration is made upon these elements: 
Necessity. There must be a reasonable necessity for the right of way 
sought by the creation of the easement by necessity. Most courts 
will be quite strict in the degree of necessity they will demand, 
stricter than with an easement implied by prior use. For an easement 
by necessity, there must be "a genuine necessity; mere convenience 
is not enough. "The easement must be "absolutely necessary;" it 
must exist "in fact and not as a mere convenience." 
360.03 (b) (5) (iii), p. 507. 
The burden upon the one seeking easement by necessity is heavy: 
Severance Leading to Lack of  Access. For an easement by necessity 
to be implied, the severance creating the dominant and servient 
tenement must have created a situation in which there was no 
access for the dominant tenement to some public roadway. 
The lack of access must be "the result" of the severance. The 
necessity must exist at the time of the severance of the two estates; 
it cannot arise later. Thus where landowners rendered their own 
property landlocked by selling off their access, they could not claim 
an easement by necessity over property from which their land was 
originally carved out; their landlocked status resulted "not from a 
grant of property to them but by their own acts in conveying away 
their highway access." (Emphasis supplied). 
THOMPSON $60.03 (b) (5) (iii), p. 507. 
2. No Necessity at Time of Convevance 
There was no access from an established road across Section 7 
into Section 8 in 1943 when Humbird conveyed to Modig, but even if there 
had been, Humbird in conveying away Section 7 would have landlocked 
Section 8. Subsequent owners of Section 8 cannot complain about what 
the common grantor did. See Schwab v. Timmons, supra. 
At the time Humbird Lumber Company conveyed its Section 7 property, it 
was separated from the public road by property now owned by Ellis Smith and 
then owned by his father. Tr., p. 102, L. 17 - 25; p. 103, L. 1 -7. Ellis Smith 
described his property in the 1920's and 1930's as being wild country without any 
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fences and with all the logging being done with horses with no automobiles using 
the area until after World War I\. Tr., p. 119, L. 14 - 25; p. 120, L. 1 - 16. 
The same result based on similar facts - no access to a public road at the 
time of severance-- was the basis of denial of easement by necessity by the 
Montana Supreme Court in Graham v. Mack, 699 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1984). 
Special emphasis was given protecting the owners of property over which the 
easement by necessity is sought: 
Though the doctrine is new to this state, one of the common threads 
running through the cases where it is at issue was stated most 
recently in Goeres v. Lindeys, Inc. (Mont. 1980), 619 P.2d 1194,37 St. 
Rep. 1846, where we explained: 
"[Elach case must be examined after an examination of the 
particular facts and circumstances. Additionally, any implied 
negative easements as to a particular lot are to be considered 
with extreme caution since an action results in depriving a 
person of the use of his property by imposing a servitude 
through mere implication." (Emphasis in  original.) 619 P.2d at 
1197,37 St. Rep. at 1850. 
Prior to the conveyance by deed to Lewis Modig on December 22, 1943, 
Humbird Lumber Company did not have any direct access from the property to 
any public road. The Humbird Lumber Company property and all of the 
surrounding property was timberland. When logged, the access to the public 
road was by temporary trespass or more likely permission from a neighbor which 
was also logging its property. 
In Blackwell v. Mayes County Ufility Services Aufhorify, 571 P.2d 435 
(Okla. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed trial court denial of 
easement by necessity: 
We find that the court committed no error in so holding, for there 
was no evidence introduced to show that at the time of the 
conveyance by the remote grantor who severed the land into two 
parcels, there was a need for an easement across defendant's land. . 
. . *  
Also, see Tiffany on Real Property (Third Edition) Section 794 in 
which Professor Tiffany states: 
"Since, we previously mentioned, the recognition of a way of 
necessity is based on the intention imputed to the parties at the time 
of the severance of the ownership, it follows that the existence of the 
privilege, and also its extent, is to be determined with reference to 
what is necessary for the use of the premises in the manner 
contemplated by the parties at the time of such severance." 
[Emphasis added and footnotes omitted]. 
See also, Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72,501 P.2d 1383 (1972) and 
Hoover v. Smifh, 248 Ark. 443,451 S.W.2d 877 (1970). 
The Nevada Supreme Court examined easement by necessity at length in 
Jackson v. Nash, 866 P.2d 262 (Nev. 1993) citing inter alia to Bob Daniels & 
Sons v. Weaver, supra. 
The easement by necessity is created by a legal fiction --that the intent of 
the grantor (never stated) was to convey or reserve an easement - but that legal 
fiction must be based on fact -- that at the time of the grant the parcel granted or 
retained had access upon a public roadway. 
There should be a higher finding of necessity when the dominant estate is 
the portion of the property retained: 
One justification of that distinction is that the seller will be the one 
with more sure knowledge of the existence of a pre-existing use and 
the one with the duty to inform the buyer that the property being 
purchased may be burdened with an easement. In order to burden 
the purchaser this way and lessen the value of the property, these 
courts will demand proof of strict necessity. 
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THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra, $60.03 (b) (4) (i), pp. 494 - 
495. 
To sum up, unity of title in Humbird Lumber Company existed prior to and 
in 1943. However, there was no access directly to a public road or by any 
recognized easement in adjacent property to a public road on the entire property 
in Section 7 and in Section 8 conveyed by Humbird Lumber Company in 1943 
and 1945. See Metzger Map, Appendix 3. There was no reasonable necessity 
at the times of conveyance. All of the property was timberland and access was 
freely granted by permission for lumbering. 
C. Backmans Cannot Claim Private Condemnation 
Bob Backman purchased the 100 acres from Randy Powers with the 
intention of selling the property in 20 acre parcels for "nice custom homes." Tr., 
p. 52, L. 5 - 23. The Backmans acquired title to the 100 acres by warranty deed 
on February 11, 2005. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. On July 12, 2005 using five 
separate quitclaim deeds, the Backmans divided the property in five 20 acre 
parcels. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. 
Acting for the Backmans, realtor Doug Ward created an advertisement for 
sale of the property for $1,200,000 for residential purposes. Tr., p. 89, L. 21 - 25; 
p. 90, L. 1- 18. Defendants Exhibit T. 
The availability of private eminent domain for residential houses under 
ldaho Code §§7-701 et seq has been barred since Cohen v. Larson, 125 ldaho 
82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993) where the unanimous opinion concluded: 
In light of this, we cannot accept the Cohen group's argument that 
slightly expanded development of their lake side lot benefits the 
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public of this state. The Cohen group's proposed development would 
make available a maximum of seven new houses or condominiums 
to already-designated private purchasers. This is not something 
which is "necessary to the complete development of the material 
resources of the state" as required by the Constitution. Nor has 
such an activity ever been recognized as conferring a benefit on the 
public sufficient to entitle a land owner to invoke the power of 
eminent domain in order to facilitate its accomplishment. 
125 ldaho at 85 
As it happened, undersigned counsel Reed was the attorney for the 
Cohens, et al and Judge Hosack was the attorney for Mae Larson. Judge 
Hosack in this case has expanded upon and added considerable weight to the 
Surpeme Court opinion of Justice Bistline. R., Vol. II, pp. 26 - 34. 
All of the reported ldaho cases on private condemnation cited Appellants' 
Brief (pp. 18 - 22), Cordwell v. Smith, 104 ldaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (App. 1983). 
Erickson v. Amoth, 99 ldaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074 (1979), McKenney v. Anselmo, 
91 ldaho 118,416 P.2d 509 (1966), MacCaskill v. Ebberf, 112 ldaho 1115,739 
P.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1987) and Eisenbarfh v. Delp, 70 ldaho 266, 215 P.2d 812 
(1950) were cited by undersigned counsel in Respondents' Brief and Brief on 
Rehearing in Cohen v. Larson, supra. Justice Bistline for the ldaho Supreme 
Court ignored them all and effectively terminated that remedy for exactly the kind 
of residential development intended by the Backmans. 
Appellants make no reference to Cohen v. Larson completely ignoring 
this dispositive opinion. In Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 ldaho 
123, 106 P. 3d 449 (2005), the ldaho Supreme Court, without citation to Cohen v. 
Larson, rejected the proposition of condemnation to a private residence as a 
reasonable alternative noting that "condemnation has been called an extra- 
ordinary power." 141 ldaho at 129. 
In the ldaho Constitutional Convention, a major dispute arose about giving 
those powers of eminent domain to private individuals and companies to obtain 
easements across neighboring properties for railways, irrigation ditches and 
roads. The debate is the subject of Chapter 4 "Eminent Domain and Private 
Property" in Professor Dennis C. Colson's book, THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION: 
THE TIE THAT BINDS, (1991), p. 62 - 72. The debate concludes with broad 
power given to the mining, agricultural and timber industries. Colson, p. 72. 
Article 1, Section 14 of the ldaho Constitution gave the authority to take 
private property for public use for irrigation and mining purposes ". . or any other 
use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the 
state." The ldaho Supreme Court quickly determined that private condemnation 
under the enabling statute, ldaho Code §§7-701 et seq. was available to timber 
companies. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 ldaho 769,88 P. 426, 118 Am. 
St. R. 233 (1906). Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 ldaho 556, 155 
P. 680, 1919 Ann. Cas. 189 (191b). 
1. Private Residences are not Material Resources 
For reasons often stated before and to be renewed, private condemnation 
is not available for private residences. However, the constitutional debate must 
be recognized with the enabling statute as providing a remedy for a landlocked 
parcel of land when public policy recognized that landlock parcels needed access 
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to develop industrial and agricultural resources of the state. In a footnote, Justice 
Bistline clearly drew the line: 
fn 3 . . .the construction of a few seasonal residences does not 
ensure the 'ccomplete development of the material resources of the state" 
as this phrase was meant. We believe this provision in the Constitution 
was meant to enable those seeking to develop valuable resources, such as 
timber, minerals, or other products of natural resources, from being 
thwarted by an inability to get access to these resources across the 
property of another. The framers of our Constitution could not have 
intended that private individuals wishing to facilitate access to their homes 
should be able to condemn the land of their neighbors for this purpose. 
125 ldaho at 85, 
The remedy sought by the Backmans would require amending the ldaho 
Constitution. 
In Cohen v. Larson, plaintiffs were seeking private condemnation of an 
existing road that had been in use for 32 years. The Larsons blocked the road in 
the belief that certain of the named plaintiffs were intending to build second 
custom homes for summertime residences on Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore. 
In the first phase of the case, District Judge Haman had rejected plaintiffs 
claim of prescriptive use accepting the Larsons' testimony that the road had been 
constructed across their property with their permission which they now revoked 
In the second phase under ldaho Code 37-701, the only burden to be imposed 
on the Larsons, if plaintiff were successful, would be to open the gate. 
The private road the Backmans sought coming off Turtle Rock Road 
would be all new construction on respondents' property and, when finished, 
would have required improvements in the POVE road estimated by Greg Zirwes 
to cost $450,000. Even then according to the engineer Creed, Turtle Rock Road 
would not meet Bonner County Road and fire standards. 
D. Backmans Failed to Prove anv of the Five Elements 
of their Prescriptive Easement Claim 
In Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 129 P. 3d. 1223 (2006)15, this Court 
repeated the well established criteria for proving an easement by prescription: 
In order to establish an easement bv ~rescriotion. a claimant must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence use'of the subject property 
that is (1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or imputed 
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory 
period of five years. Hodgins, 139 ldaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973; see 
I.C. 55-203. A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the 
servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, 
by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Marshall, 
130 ldaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. Indeed, the rule is well established 
that no use can be considered adverse or ripen into a prescriptive 
right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on 
the rights of the owner. Simmons, 63 ldaho at 144,118 P.2d at 744. 
142 ldaho at 480. 
In Hodgins v. Sales, 135 ldaho 222, 76 P.3d 969 (2003), this Court 
stressed the necessity of establishing all five of the elements by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must make 
findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a judgment on 
appeal. 
139 ldaho at 229. 
The Backmans have limited their claim to Turtle Rock Road. This 
eliminates the necessity of any discussion of use of Redtail Hawk and the upper 
road during Powers logging operation which lasted two years. Tr., p. 260, 
15 Cited in Appellants' Brief on seven different pages. 
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1) Open and notorious; and 
2) Continuous and Uninterrupted. 
Randy Powers described Turtle Rock Road when he was using it in 1995 
as having "eight or ten inch grass" with ruts that he needed to grade. Tr. p. 252, 
L. 16-20; p. 257, L. 3-7. Powers agreed that the property up to the time he 
purchased it in 1993 ". . . was kind of wild, was unenclosed . . ." Tr., p. 256., L 
19-21. 
Powers use of Turtle Rock Road to access the lower road and the middle 
road during his logging operation could be characterized as open and notorious. 
After 1996, any use by Powers of Turtle Rock Road was no different than any 
other member of the public. 
After finishing logging, Powers ". . .never was back with equipment" Tr., 
p. 281, L. 20. For several years, Powers went up once a month for maybe eight 
or nine months of the year to monitor stream run-off. Tr., p. 264, L. 13 - 25; p. 
265, L 1- 19. He drove a four wheeler recreational vehicle that was no different 
than the vehicles typically used by residents and members of the public. Tr., p. 
272, L. 2 - 8. 
Powers went hunting in the fall a couple of times a year, again, like so 
many other people in Bonner County. Tr., p. 282, L. 23 - 25; p. 284, L. 1 - 13. 
In all the years between 1996 and 2004, Powers went camping only once or 
twice. Tr., p. 262, L. 4 - 13. 
3) Adverse and Under a Claim of Right. 
Because others had used the road on timber production, Powers thought 
he had a prescriptive easement. Tr., p. 258, L. 1- 20. Attorney Erbland asked 
Powers if he knew the elements of a prescriptive easement and he answered 
only "just usage, continued usage." Tr., p. 259, L. 3. 
Asked about adverse and under a claim of right, this was Powers 
response: 
Erbland Q: Well, if you had what you believed to be a right to use 
those roads by prescription, why didn't you push the 
issue? 
Powers A: 
Erbland Q: 
Well, the road was still usable, you know, when they put 
the rocks in. And I was just wanting to get along with 
everybody. 
And that is typically what you do, isn't it? You ask 
landowners for permission and try to develop what I 
think you said was a rapport with them to access their 
property? 
Powers A: Yes. 
Tr., p. 280, L. 17 - 25. 
4) With the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement. 
Except for Dr. Lawrence who gave permission (Tr., p. 287, L. 1- - 14), 
there were no houses on the property crossed by Turtle Rock Road. Tr., p. 287, 
L. 15 - 17. Powers testified that he never saw anybody on the property during 
the entire two years when he was logging or at any time thereafter until he sold 
the property. Tr., p. 287, L. 1 - 25, p. 258, L. 1 - 13. 
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In all the time Powers logged his property, he had never talked to anyone 
on site: 
Reed Q: And there were no houses down here where we have the 
property of Christopher Bessler are listed right down in  here. 
In other words, going from the intersection of Turtle Rock 
Road and Redtail to the Lawrence property, no one lived in  
this property? 
Powers A: Correct. 
Reed Q: Didn't see anyone there? 
Powers A: No. 
Reed Q: And there were no fences on the property? 
Powers A: Correct. 
Tr., p. 288, L. 5 - 13. 
The CC&Rs for POVE were created in 1996, but house building did not 
start until 1999. Tr., p. 448, L. 24-25; p. 450, L. 4-1 1. 
5) For the statutory period. 
Two years is not five years. 
1 Common Use Rule Properly Applied 
Judge Hosack determination that the use of Turtle Rock Road the 
occasional connection into Section 8 for logging purposes prior to Powers' 
purchase in 1994 was proper under the common use road theory. 
All roads in Section 7 as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 41 derived from a pre- 
1994 U.S.G.S. aerial photo including the connections Turtle Rock Road to the 
north to Inspiration Way were for logging purposes. 
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All the relevant lands in both Sections 7 and Section 8 were owned by 
logging companies or loggers until Louisiana Pacific conveyed the POVE 
property to Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc. in 1994 and Yellowstone Basin 
had the property surveyed. Defendants, Exhibit A. Plaintiffs Exhibits 26, 27 and 
28. 
Appellants argument that there was no evidence of common use is 
contradicted by the testimony of Lannie Moody based on first hand knowledge as 
a logger and road builder in the area for 35 years. Tr., p. 536, L. 2 - 6. Mr. 
Moody with his family logged the Backman property for W. I. Forest Products 
Incorporated starting in 1975. Tr., p. 540, L. 4 - 9; p. 544, L. 13 - 15. 
Mr. Moody testified to starting off Turtle Rock Road using an old spur 
road, crossing Syringa Creek with a "punching culvert" onto a "one lane logging 
access only, steep, narrow, rocky rough trail into the Backman property. Tr., p. 
540, L. 2 - 25; p. 5421, L. 13 - 16. Mr. Moody identified this as what in trial was 
the lower road. Tr., p. 541, 1. 2 - 4. 
Lannie Moody's father had built a cabin on the Modig property in 1945 
when he came back from World War II and Turtle Rock Road was access to that 
cabin. Tr., p.544, L. 16-23. p. 545, L.7-12. 
Dalyn Marley with her husband had acquired their property in 1991. Her 
father-in-law had earlier obtained an easement from Louisiana Pacific which 
owned all the property down to Baldy Mountain Road. Tr., p. 612, L. 21 - 28; p. 
613 L. 1 - 5. The Marley access in 1991 and before was from the Baldy 
Mountain public road onto Turtle Rock Road through the City of Sandpoint 
Shooting Range to the junction in the west she had named Redtail Hawk Road. 
Tr., p. 614, L. 21 -25; p. 615, L. 1- 9. 
Turtle Rock Road had been constructed by a logging company at least as 
early at 1975 and work that was done on Turtle Rock Road had been done by 
the logging company owner and not by any owner of property in Section 8. 
The only evidence on the record of a road being constructed from Section 
7 into Section 8 is that connected with Lannie Moody's logging operation starting 
in 1975. That operation was from property owned by the Moodys. The use of 
that road was into Section 8, one not three intrusions, was minimal with 
absolutely no impact or adverse effect on Turtle Rock Road on the Moody 
property. 
Use of Turtle Rock Road for the logging operation into Section 8 in 1975 
and at all other times must ". . . be presumed to be by way of license or 
permission." Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740, 
(1941), Melendez v. Ninfz, 11 1 Idaho 401,404,724 P.2d 137, - (App. 1986). 
2) Powers Property was Wild and Unenclosed 
Judge Hosack found that prior to the 1990's ". . .the relevant portions of 
the Syringa Creek drainage consisted of wild and unenclosed land" Vol. II, R. p. 
278. Appellants' witness Ellis Smith, still living in the same house, affirmed that 
all of the property was wild and unenclosed. Tr., p. 120, L. 2 - 13. 
Dalyn Marley testified that from the time they acquired their property in 
1991 through moving into their house in 1997, Redtail Hawk Road was only a fire 
access road. ". . .primitive, primitive not maintained by anyone." Tr., p. 612, L. 21 
Judge Hosack found and concluded as follows: 
Where the alleged prescriptive easement is over wild and 
unenclosed land, there is a rebuttable presumption that the use of 
the land is permissive. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225 (2003). 
Because the land in question was essentially open to anyone, and 
was freely and openly used by members of the general public; and 
because a logging operation, in and of itself, and particularly in wild 
and unenclosed timberlands, does not establish an adverse use; 
there is insufficient evidence in this record of independent, decisive 
acts indicating separate and exclusive use of Syringa Creek Road by 
owners of the one-hundred twenty (120) acres in Section 8 sufficient 
to rebut the presumption of permissive use. 
R., Vol. II, p. 278. 
The quotation from Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho at 79, cited in Appellants' 
Brief at page 36 is followed by this law equally applicable in this case as it was in 
Cordwell in denying defendants claim of easement by necessity: 
A way of necessity arises from public policy considerations. It is, literally, 
a creature of necessity. The necessity must exist at the time of the severance by 
the common owner, and the person claiming such an easement must also show 
there is present necessity for it 
. . . The trial court made no finding of necessity at the time of 
severance. 
When lands have been severed, the grantee - or his successors in 
interest - cannot, by subdividing, create a new and different 
"necessity" for rights-of-way, where no such necessity existed 
before the severance. See 2 G. W. Thompson, Real Property, $373, 
.398 (repl. 1980); Gulotta v. Triano, 125 Ariz. 144, 608 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 
App. 1980); Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Or. 97,29 P. 268 (Or. 1982). A 
remote grantee cannot create the necessity upon which he relies. 
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105 ldaho at 79 - 80. 
Appellants have failed to establish that they have a right to an easement 
under four theories. Under easement by necessity or implied easement nor can 
they properly claim private condemnation. The attempt to combine or couple will 
not work because there is nothing to couple. To use the railroad analogy 
appropriate to railroad lands, there cannot be any coupling because appellants 
never put any easement cars on track. See Judge Hosack's disposition of the 
coupling claim. R., Vol. I!, pp. 38 - 44. 
E. Respondents Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal 
Attorneys' fees were not sought at the trial court level. However, 
respondents are entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal if the 
appeal only invites the appellate court to second guess the trial court. Hogg v, 
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, - (2006). Gibson v. Ada 
Counfy, 142 Idaho 746,761, 133 P.3d 1211, - (2006) 
In Hughes v. Fisher, supra, this Court repeated the accepted rule on 
appeal concerning facts found in trial: 
On appeal, this Court will set aside findings of fact only i f  they are 
clearly erroneous. Id.; I.R.C.P. Rule 52 (a). Thus, i f  a district court's 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb those findings. 
Hodgins. 139 ldaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973. Also, this Court gives due 
regard to the district court's special opportunity to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses who personally appear before the court. 
142 ldaho at 179 - 180. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike every reported appellate case in Idaho involving an easement 
issue, the complaint in this case was not precipitated by a property owners' good 
faith belief based upon on the ground observations and predecessors 
recollection that there was in fact a roadway or access to his or her property. 
- 
The complaint in this case was filed because Chicago Title Company had 
erroneously issued two title policies guaranteeing access thereby creating an 
exposure close to one million dollars. The named respondents, the Spagons, 
Lloyds, Johnsons, Zirwes, McKennas, Grants and Wes Millward, Chris Bessler 
and POVE were compelled to defend and counterclaim. These respondents all 
lived upon and used roads that were designated as private of record, posted as 
private and patrolled for privacy. 
None of the named respondents had ever given any cause for the 
Beckmans nor the title insurance representatives to believe that any right to a 
road into Section 8 existed. To the contrary through POVE, written notice had 
been given to Randy Powers that he had no right to bulldoze his way across the 
Lloyd and Johnson properties across Syringa Creek into his property. 
Defendants Exhibit U. Ten months before the complaint was filed, POVE had 
notified Doug Ward and Bob Backman that there was no access and filed of 
record in Bonner Couny the Declaration of Non-Access. 
Chicago Title Company brought suit upon legal theories that were 
explicitly excluded from coverage in the title insurance policies issued to Powers 
and Backman: 
B. General Exceptions: 
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the 
public records. 
2. Encroachments, overlaps, boundary line dispute, and any 
other matters which would be disclosed by an accurate survey 
or inspection of the premises including, but not limited to, 
insufficient or impaired access or matters contradictory to any 
survey plat shown by the public records. 
3. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public 
records. 
Defendants Exhibits 0 and Q. 
District Judge Hosack listened carefully and then prepared a thorough and 
detailed 41 page Memorandum Order. R., Vol. II, pp. 258 -299. Then Judge 
Hosack elaborated on points not fully covered after oral argument on plaintiffs' 
motion to amend. Tr., pp. 723 - 746. R., Voi. II, pp. 370 - 375. 
The judgment entered on January 2, 2008 denying all claims made by 
appellants Backman and dismissing with prejudice the Second Amended 
Complaint of the Backmans and cross-claims of cross-claimant ~chrader" must 
be affirmed, and respondents Spagon, et al and Grant be awarded their costs 
and attorney's fees as against appellants Backman. 
Attorney for Respondents 
Spagon, et al 
16 Cross-claimant Schrader did not appeal. 
APPENDIX A 
RENK REPORT 
When the Lalre Was A Millpond: 
Ifumbird Lumber Company 
and its Sawmill at Sandpoint, Idaho 
1900-1948 
Nancy P. Renlc 
Plnme Creelc I-listorical Services 
Sandpoint, Ida110 
Figure 1. Jol~n A. Nambird, i~tldated piloto. Cor~rtesy of the Bonner C o ~ ~ n t y  tlistorical Society 
Museum Collections. 
Weyerhaeuser, I-Iumbird, and other associates traveled to northern Idaho in October 1900. 
They firs1 toured the Clearwater region where they had recently secured 40,000 acres. 
Then Weyerhaeuser and his son Charles went north to Sandpoint where they met wit11 
Norman Holter, acting manager of the Sand Point Lumber Co. On a rainy day, the 
prospective buyers piled into a wagon with Holter, his wife, and a local guide and headed 
out to inspect the timber first hand. The bad weather was not a detriment; in fact, the 
elder Weyerhaeuser remarked "that lie lilced to buy timber when it was raining and sell it 
on a day when the sun was shining." Within a few days, Ilumbird and Edward Rutledge, 
another well-known lumberman, came to Sandpoint to look over the prospects at the mill. 
Apparently the business looked like a good investment (Holter 1941: 2). 
Incorporation of Elurnbird L ~ ~ m b e r  Company 
Back in St. Paul, buyers and sellers met with an attorney on December 3, 1900, to work 
out details of the sale. After agreeing on a sale price of$190,000, Weyerhaeuser and 
I-Iumbird offered A. M. Holter and W. E. Cullen a choice of either cash or stock in.the 
new company. Cullen toolc the cash option and tlolter, remembering his difficulties as an 
absentee owner, postponed his decision until he lcnew who would be managing the 
operations. Once he learned that John Humbird's son, Thomas J. Hnmbird, would be 
moving to Sandpoint to manage the mill operations, Holter toolc the stock option (Holter 
1941: 2-3). 
Three days after this meeting, on December 6, 1900, Humbird Lumber Company 
incorporated under the laws of the state of Washington. The original capital investment 
of $500,000 was divided into 5,000 shares of stoclc, each worth $100. Four sharellolders 
(John A. Humbird, Fredericlc Weyerhaeuser, F. C. A. Denlunann, and A. M. I-Iolter) held 
1,000 shares each; Edward Rutledge held 999 shares; and George S. Long held one. The 
new company had its first stockholder meeting a week after incorporation. At that time, 
they elected trustees (all of the stoclcholders but Holter); adopted bylaws; and, most 
importantly, approved the purchase of Sand Point Lumber Co. (The date on the deed of 
sale for the mill and some associated lands is February 12, 1901.) On January 7, 1901, 
the stockholders elected the officers. The list held no surprises: John A. Humbird, 
president; Fredericlc Weyerhaeuser, vice president; Edward Rutledge, secretary; John A. 
Humbird, treasurer; and Thoinas J. Flumbird, general manager (Bonner County Deed 
Record, Book 4:238-239; Humbird ca. 1947: 6-7; Humbird Ltimber Co. 1900). 
The appointment of Thomas J. Humbird to be general manager of the new lumber 
company elevated a second generation ofI3umbirds in the timber business. He had 
worked for more than seventeen years for the White River Lumber Company in Mason, 
Wisconsin, a mill owned and run by his father, John A. Humbird, and associates 
including Frederick Weyerhaeuser. T. J. I-Iumbird had started in the company store there, 
working his way up to managing the store before beginning to take over more of the 
sawmill operations. By 1900, he was familiar with many aspects of the lumber business. 
After several decades of living there, he was also well established in Mason, where he 
and his family recently had built a large new home. He later recalled the decision to 
move him to the new operations in Idaho. At a meeting wit11 Weyerhaeuser in St. Paul, 
the older man told him about his recent trip to Idaho where he and John Humbird had 
bought Sand Point Lumber Co., followed by the organization of the new Humbird 
Lumber Co. "I told . . . [your father] that I wanted you to go out and manage this 
company, that we had bought it for you? Weyerhaeuser said. He then continued, "You 
will malce a great many mistakes. Your father does and I do. Everyone who 
accomplished anything does, but try not to malce the same mistalce twice. I know you can 
manage this company and I want you to go out there and do it." During negotiations, 
Weyerhaeuser offered to raise Humbird's salary from his current $2,833.33 per year to a 
full $3,000. With the difference given in advance, there was $166.67 to cover moving 
expenses (Humbird ca. 1939: 38-39,42,45,48; Humbird ca. 1947:4). 
It is not known how T. J. Humbird felt about this promotion and move, but he did. as he 
was told. Just a few weeks after his appointment, after celebrating the Christmas holiday 
with his wife and children, he left home for the uilfamiliar territory of Sandpoint, Idaho, 
arriving to four feet of snow. The town was "in a feverish excitement" over the news that 
the well-lcnown Weyerhaeuser syndicate had bought the local lumber mill. Thomas 
Humbird set to work at his new job but within a few months, he suffered a nervous 
brealcdown He spent the next two and a half years recuperating, first under a doctor's 
care in Wisconsin, and later in Florida and ~heinainus, British Columbia, where another 
&ily business, the Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company, was located. It is 
apparent that he returned to Sandpoint from time to time, probably after he moved his 
family to Spokane in 1901, but he turned active management of the sawmill over to A. E. 
Riclcerd for this difficult period (Humbird ca. 1939: 52; Humbird ca. 1947: 4-5, 7; Silver 
Blade, 15 December l900,3:1). 
IIumbird Family and Rttsiness Associates 
The men involved in the I-Iumbird Lumber Company included three generations of the 
Humbird family, as well as multiple generations of their business associates. It was a 
family business, where sons followed in their father's footsteps and took direction from 
the older generation. The sons were expected to work hard and were not coddled with 
easy jobs or exorbitant salaries. The family business also depended on its personal and 
business ties with other lumber barons, especially the family of Frederick Weyerhaeuser, 
as well as officials of the Northern Pacific Railroad. 
The Humbird family included the following lumbermen: 
0 John Alexander Humbird (1836-191 1). He initially followed his father, Jacob, 
into railroad construction, worlcing with him in Brazil during the mid-1 860s. John 
Humbird entered the lumber business in Wisconsin in 1875, first with Huinbird & 
Company in Clayton, and later with the White River Lumber Company in Mason. 
He and the other investors sold this last company in 1905, making a tidy profit. 
He remained active in the lumber industry for the rest of his life. At the time of 
his death in 191 1, he was still president and treasurer of Humbird Lumber 
Company, as well as president of Clearwater Timber Company and Victoria 
Lumber & Manufacturing Company (Humbird ca. 1939: 11-13, 15,26-28,63; 
I-Iumbird ca. 1947: 17; Humbird n.d.: 10). 
Thomas J. Humbird ( 1  865-1956). Although he was born in Brazil, Thomas 
Humbird grew up in the lumber industry in Wisconsin. After graduating from 
high school in 1882, he joined the staff at the White River Lumber Comvanv's 
. , 
store in Mason, worlcing his way up to manager. He also became familiar with 
the operations of the sawmill and toolc over the management from his father in 
Figrrre 2. Thomas .J. Hnmbird (seated) with his son .loLn A. I-lnmbird and dasghter-in-law Hedvig 
Pearson Hnmbird, ea. 1920. Photo conrtesy o f  the Bonner Connty Historical Society Maseom 
Collection. 
1888. He remained there until he was appointed general manager of the newly- 
formed Humbird Lumber Company in December 1900. I-Ie remained manager of 
that company until replaced by his own son in 191 9. T. J. Humbird also served as 
president of the company from 191 1 until its dissolution in 1948. Like his father, 
he served as an officer or board member for otl~er companies, including the 
Weyerhaeuser Sales Company, Clearwater Timber Company, Potlatch Forests, 
Inc., and Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company (Hidy et al. 1963: 93,662; 
Numbird ca. 1939: 38-39,42,48). 
John A. Humbird (1888-1963). As a child, John Numhird moved with his family 
to Spoltane, Washington, in the spring of 1901, soon aRer his father took over as 
manager of the Humbird Lumber Company in Sandpoint. Once he was old 
enough, the younger I-Iumbird worlced in the lumber shipping department during 
his summer vacations, with at least one summer (1907) loading railroadcars on 
the night shift in ICootenai. He briefly attended Princeton University but soon 
returned to the family's line of work in the lumber industry. Be worked as 
assistant manager of I-Iumbird Lumber Company from 191 1-1917 and then as 
general manager from 1919-1923. During World War I, he served in the U.S. 
Army where he rose fkom Lieutenant to Captain and earned numerous awards 
from both the French and American military. He was appointed general manager 
in 1923 for the Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company in Chemainus, 
British Columbia, a position he held until his retirement in 1944 (Humbird 11.d.: 1 ;  
T .  J .  Humbird ca. 1939: 57; Princeton University 1963: 14). 
The Humbirds were business associates o f  many proininent lumbermen over the years. 
Those involved with Humbird Lumber Company included the legendary Frederick 
Weyerhaeuser and two o f  his sons, John Philip and Frederick E. Weyerl~aeuser. Other 
multi-generational associates were Montana lumberman A. M. Holter and his son, 
Norman B. Nolter, along with Northern Pacific land agent William 13. Phipps and his son, 
Stephen C. Phipps (Humbird ca. 1947, ca. 1951). 
Land Acquisitions 
Around the turn o f  the century, the pattern o f  land ownership changed dramatically in 
northern Idaho as vast tracts o f  land in the federal domain were set aside for Forest 
Reserves, transferred to state holdings, or moved inlo private ownership. From 1900- 
1909, an estimated one-third o f  the timberlands in the Inland Nortl~west changed 
ownership. The major private land holder was the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 
which had been granted more than 38 million acres o f  public lands to encourage the 
building ofthe transcontinental railroad as well as to help offset the tremendous costs o f  
construction. This grant included alternate sections o f  land on both sides o f  the railroad 
line, extending forty miles on either side ofthe tracks through Idaho. Mt~ch smaller 
parcels left the public domain as settlers moved into the region and began filing under the 
1862 Homestead Act for up to 160 acres. Others, many of them not even residents o f  the 
region, filed under the 1878 Timber andstone Act which allowed 160 acre claims when 
the claimant affirmed that the timber and stone was intended solely for personal use and 
not for speculation. There was rampant abuse under this act, especially by timber 
companies which paid dummy entrymen to make the claims and then turn them over to 
the corporations. Approximately 3.6 million acres nationwide had been claimed under 
this act by 1900, and most d t h e  profits went to large timber companies (Billington 1974: 
608; Fahey 1985: 97). 
While the purchase of  Sand Point Lumber Company brought with it a small amount o f  
timberland, Humbird Lumber Con~pany officials recognized immediately that they 
needed much more. They began negotiations with Northern Pacific Railroad and secured 
just over 20,000 acres in early January 1901, paying more than $144,000. Most o f  this 
land was in the Priest River drainage. Two other large deals with the railroad lollowed in 
1902-1903. The first included nearly 45,000 acres in the Hoodoo Valley and another 
7,000 acres in the area around Naples and hfcArthur. The second purchase covered 
nearly 60,000 acres in several townships covering much o f  the area tributary to the Pack 
River. The final major deal occurred in 1910 when the company purchased nearly 18,000 
acres northeast o f  Sandpoint in the Grouse, Gold, and Rapid L,igltning drainages. In 
addition, the company bought just under 2,800 acres o f  land in scattered small sales from 
the railroad, along with a later purchase o f  over 6,700 acres on the Upper Pack River. In 
all, nearly 75 percent o f  Humbird holdings came from the Northern Pacific Railroad 
(Humbird ca. 1947: 62-64). 
Table 1. Harmbird Lirmber Company Purchases from Northern Pacific Railroad 
Acres Price Av. PriceIAcre Date of Deed 
20,018 $144,133.05 $7.20 1-7-1901 
52,321 $148,324.50 $2.83 7-22-1902 
59,309 $197,197.53 $3.32 10-5-1903 
17,899 $300,000.00 $16.76 7-11-1910 
2,785 $9,596.55 $3.44 Various 
6.719 $90,000.00 $13.40 After 1916 
159,051 $889,251.63 $5.60 
(Source: Humbird ca. 1947: 62-64.) 
John A. Humbird had a profitable business relationship with the Northern Pacific 
Railroad. William If. Phipps, land commissioner for the railroad, had been one of 
Humbird's business partners for many years. Humbird had hired Phipps in 1872 to serve 
as land commissioner for what became the Cl~icago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha 
Railway Company, and Phipps held this position until he moved to the Northern Pacific 
in 1893. The two men also were associated in the Cumberland Land Company during the 
late 1800s, buying white pine tracts in Minnesota. Following ihe organization of the 
Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company in 1889, Phipps became a stoclcholder and 
officer for many years. In addition to these business relationships, the two men were 
"warm personal fiiends" (Humbird ca. 1939: 1 1-12, 17-1 8,30; Humbird ca. 1947: 62; 
Humbird ca. 1951: unnxnnbered page on Wm. If. Phipps). 
Despite the warm friendship, thetwo men were not above hard bargaining. During 
negotiations for tile 60,000 acres of lands tributary to the Paclc River, they got hung up 
over mineral rights. Deeds from the railroad typically retained mineral rights for the 
seller, a fact well-known to I-Iumbird and his associates. I-Ie claimed, however, that he 
had not been told of this exclusion at the beginning of the bargaining. After consulting 
with Frederick Weyerhaeuser, I-Iumbird continued to object because they had found 
through experience that such a reservation made it more difficult to resell the lands once 
logging was finished. Ile went on, "We are now and have been spending so much money 
on mills and improvements for tlie manufacture of this timber that we do not at this late 
date want to give it up and do not feel that you ought to insist npon the reservation, but if 
you do insist upon it, we feel that your company ought to at least pay half the taxes." 
Plxipps took up Humbird's concerns with C. S. Mellen, President of Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company, in March 1902, but he was c~nable to get the mineral clause removed. 
More than a year later, Phipps tried to put pressure on Humbird officials to close the deal, 
but it toolc until October 1903 to finalize the sale (Phipps 1902a-c, 1903a-b). 
Up to 1910, John A. Humbird and Predericlc Weyerhaeuser had been the company's 
negotiators with Northern Pacific. That year, however, Thomas J. Ifnmbird brokered his 
first deal with the railroad. Dover Lumber Company had obtained considerable acreage 
in the mountains northeast of Sandpoint, mixed in with the checkerboard of Northern 
Pacific holdings. T. J. Humbird suggested that Ilumbird Lumber should try to buy these 
railroad lands, a move that both older men approved. The younger I-Iurnbird also wanted 
to push the railroad to throw in enough steel for a logging railroad, along with an 
agreement to buy ties from the company. This seemed excessive to the others and they 
advised against it, but they let the younger manager see what he could do. After a month 
of negotiations in St. Paul, T. J. Numbird emerged triumphant with an agreement to 
purchase twenty-eight sections of land. In addition to the land, be obtained the means to 
log it: enough steel rails, switches, etc. for twenty-five miles of logging railroad, for a 
rent of $100/mile; permission to connect the logging railroad with the main line at 
Kootenai; permission to run logging trains on the main tracks between Kootenai and 
Sandpoint for $llinile/train; and rental of logging flat cars at fifty cents per day. A 
further bonus was the agreement that the raiiroad would bay a minimum of 150,000 ties 
and a maximum of 300,000 ties every year for ten years, with the price negotiated 
annually. This purchase suddenly put Humbird Lulnber Company at an advantage over 
Dover Lu~nber Company in the area northeast of Sandpoint, and the two companies 
eventually traded some lands to bloclc up larger areas for each (Humbird ca. 1947: 14-16). 
The company obtained other lands, in smaller parcels, from individual land owners. In 
addition, it bought the rights to the timber, excepting the land, from a number of people. 
Humbird officials initially were slow to pick up these claims since they had set a price 
limit for white pine of $1 per thousand board feet, wcll below what the owners could sell 
to others. After T. J. I-lumbird had recovered his health and returned to work at the mill 
in Sandpoint ca. 1903, he decided to pay the aslcing price to help build up the company's 
timber inventory. The other company officers approved and the offer rose to $3 per 
thousand board feet; the price covered not only white pine but also cedar poles, mixed 
species, and the land itself (Humbird ca. 1947: 8, 61). 
Humbird Lumber Company also purchased the timber from state lands. In one state sale 
in 1907, T. J. Humbird and F. A. Blaclcwell, owner oEPanhandle Lumber Company in 
Spirit Lalce, devised a strategy ahead of time whereby both companies ended up with 
much of the timber they wanted. During the sale, the representative from each of these 
two companies bid on every tract of timber offered based on the company's independent 
timber cruise. Unless a third company joined the bidding, I-Iumbird and Blackwell did 
not raise bids against each other. At the end of the sale, they divided the timber up so 
that each company got the tracts that were tributary to its mill; this enabled Humbird to 
obtain the timber on 2,837 acres of state lands. There was a twenty-year time limit for 
cutting this timber without forfeit, however. In 1920, Humbird Lumber Company 
decided to buy the state lands under some of its purchases, for $10 per acre, to retain 
rights to the timber (Humbird ca. 1947: 12,62). 
Nunlbird Lumber Company, 1901-1909: A Time of Expansion 
The newly organized I-Iumbird Lumber Company arrived in northern Idaho on the eve of 
the regional boom in lumber production. The first decade of the twentieth century saw 
production statewide increase thirteen-fold, from 56 million board feet in 1899 to 728 
million board feet in 191 1. There was a rush to buy timberland, open new mills, and get 
products onto the national market. As the industry expanded during this period, Humbird 
also grew at a rapid pace. The company bought more than 150,000 acres of forests; 
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Humbird Lumber Company in Sandpoint exemplified large lumber companies in the 
Inland Nortl~west during the early twentieth century. It was founded and run by 
experienced tunlbermen from the upper Midwest who were attracted to the region by its 
vast stands of white pine and other virgin timber. Biith the Humbird and Weyerhaeuser 
families were well-financed and well-connected, which enabled Humbird Lumber to 
acquire thousands of acres of timber lands, rebuild after disastrous fires, and continue in 
business during difficult times. As was typical of the lumber industry of the time, 
Humbird Lumber was not designed to be a never-ending operation using sustainable yield 
practices in its forests. Instead, under the management of T. J. I-lumbird, the company cut 
the timber and then sold the underlying lands. As the white pine was depleted or became 
difficult to reach, and market conditions turned bad, Humbird Lumber terminated its 
operations and shut down its three sawmills. When T. J. Humbird analyzed the situation 
in the late 1920s, this was the expedient thing to do since he believed that the company 
had run its course. The closnre not only stopped the financial losses but also ensured 
greater profits for the stoclcholders. And this, after all, was a primary purpose of the 
company. 
Today there is little left to see at the once-bustling mill site. The huge buildings are gone, 
marlced only by bits of foundations and remnants of building materials. The lake, once 
filled with logs from Sandpoint to Kootenai, is empty and waves lap at the foundations. 
The myriad sounds of the mill, from immigrant voices to the din of a steam engine, are 
quiet. The foundations and associated archaeological site are all that remains of 
Sandpoint's largest lumber mill, an industry that s~~stained the town for three decades. 
Indeed, they are all that is left of an entire era when trees were tall and sawmills dotted 
the shores of the lake and river. 
(Source: Humbird Lumber Company ca. 1937; Annual Reports). 
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